Maturino resendiz biography

He used many aliases, but was chiefly known and sought after as Rafael Resendez-Ramirez. United States government records show that he had been deported to Mexico at least four times since first entering the U. After each murder, he would linger in the homes for a while, mainly to eat. He stole jewelry and other items, and gave them to his wife and mother, who lived in Rodeo, Durango, Mexico.

Much of the jewelry was sold or melted down. Money was sometimes left at the scene. He raped some of his female victims; however, rape was probably a secondary intent. Most of his victims were found covered with a blanket, or otherwise obscured from immediate view. At punishment, the jury heard evidence of numerous other murders committed by appellant.

Holly Dunn testified that in August ofappellant approached her and Christopher Maier near some railroad tracks in Lexington, Kentucky. Appellant robbed Dunn and Maier. He then bound Maier's hands and feet and gagged him. Appellant picked up a large object and beat Maier in the head with it, crushing his skull. After murdering Maier, appellant sexually assaulted Dunn.

Appellant killed Mason by hitting her in the head with an iron. In May ofappellant traveled to Weimar, Texas, and beat Skip and Karen Sirnic to death with a sledge hammer while they slept in their home. In June ofappellant unlawfully entered Noemi Dominguez's home, sexually assaulted her, and killed her with a pickax. Appellant stole Dominguez's car and traveled to Schulenberg, Texas, where he killed year-old Josephine Konvicka with the same pickax used on Dominguez.

Appellant left the pickax embedded in Konvicka's head. Also in June ofappellant unlawfully entered year-old George Morber's home in Gorham, Illinois. Morber's daughter, Carolyn Frederick, was with Morber when appellant broke in. Appellant tied Morber to a chair and shot him in the back of the head with a shotgun. Appellant then sexually assaulted Frederick and struck her in the head with the shotgun with such force that the shotgun broke into two pieces.

The facts of the instant case and appellant's history permit a rational juror to conclude that appellant would continue to be a threat to society. Accordingly, we hold the evidence legally sufficient to support the jury's affirmative answer to the future dangerousness issue. Jackson, U. Appellant's third point of error is overruled. In his first point of error, appellant claims he was denied a fair trial when the trial court refused to admit crime scene photographs relating to extraneous offenses committed by appellant.

At the guilt phase of maturino resendiz biography, Dr. Bruce Cohen testified for the defense that he believed appellant was insane at the time he committed the capital murder in this case. He testified that he relied on various interviews, letters, records, and reports, as well as crime scene photographs of six other murders committed by appellant in forming his opinion.

On direct examination, Cohen was shown the crime scene photographs and was asked to describe to the jury what the photographs depicted. The defense then offered the photographs into evidence. The State objected pursuant to Rule of Evidence d that the photographs were not relevant simply because Cohen relied upon them to form his opinion. Specifically, the State argued that the photographs were not relevant because the question in this case was whether appellant was insane at the time he committed Benton's murder, not the murders depicted in the photographs.

The trial court sustained the State's objection. This Court reviews the trial court's ruling under an abuse of discretion standard and will not reverse the trial court's ruling unless it falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Salazar v. State, 38 S. State, 22 S. The trial court ruled that the crime scene photos were not relevant because they did not depict the crime scene where Benton was killed, thus they were inadmissible.

The court then conducted the balancing test for inadmissible evidence under Rule d and determined that the photographs could have been used for improper maturino resendiz biographies. If, uhm, it's, you know, cumulative, you know, needless delay, confusion of the issues, and basically it's under that rule as well. Under Ruleevidence is relevant if it has the tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the case more or less probable than it would be without the evidence.

The photographs in this case were relevant because they go to the issue of appellant's sanity. However, as stated by the trial court, under Rulerelevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Evidence may confuse or mislead the jury if it distracts the jury from the main issues in the case or tends to focus the jury's attention on facts tangential to the case before them. The photographs in question were likely to distract the jury from the facts of the crime charged and focus their attention on other crime scenes.

Maturino resendiz biography

While the photographs were relevant to the issue of appellant's sanity, merely viewing the photographs would not necessarily prove that appellant was legally insane, therefore their probative value was limited. Additionally, Section 8. Section 8. The trial court's alternative theory for the exclusion of the photographs under Rule was correct.

Appellant's first and second points of error are overruled. In his fourth point of error, appellant contends the future dangerousness special issue was unconstitutional because that issue was not susceptible to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, appellant argues that in the capital punishment context, jurors apply a higher standard than proof beyond a reasonable doubt because they will tolerate virtually no risk in assessing future danger.

The jury was properly instructed on the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We presume the jury follows the trial court's instructions. Colburn v. Appellant presents no evidence to rebut this presumption. Appellant's fourth point of error is overruled. We have previously rejected this argument. McDuff v. Appellant's fifth point of error is overruled.

In his sixth point of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting the expert testimony of FBI Special Agent Alan Brantley because his testimony was not shown to be reliable. Appellant did not object to the reliability of Brantley's testimony at trial. Therefore, he has not preserved error for our review. Appellant also contends that Brantley's testimony should not have been admitted because it was not relevant.

Appellant made a relevancy objection at trial. We review the trial court's decision to admit evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Salazar, 38 S. We will reverse the trial judge's decision only if it is outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. The State called Brantley to rebut appellant's insanity defense. Brantley testified that in June ofhe was contacted by the Houston Division of the FBI to consult with FBI agents, local police officers, and state law enforcement officials regarding this case.

He visited several crime scenes in Texas which were later connected to appellant. He also reviewed appellant's medical records, witness statements, letters written by appellant, and interviews with law enforcement. In this case, appellant displayed the characteristics of an organized sexual serial killer by committing murders at night, using rear locations to enter homes, committing murders near railroad tracks, and selecting random victims.

He displayed the characteristics of a geographically mobile offender by traveling nationally and internationally. Brantley testified that all of those characteristics demonstrated an effort to elude law enforcement. Brantley related that as a geographically mobile organized sexual serial killer, appellant displayed criminal sophistication rather than psychotic behavior.

Brantley's testimony was relevant to rebut appellant's defensive theory of insanity. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. Appellant argues further that even if Brantley's testimony was relevant, it should not have been admitted at trial because any probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence At trial, appellant made only one Rule objection to Brantley's testimony:.

They select victims that are strangers, so this random victim selection is intent on eluding law enforcement authority better, because when you consider basic law enforcement homicide investigative techniques they generally start with the victim's inner circle of friends, family, and associates in an attempt to develop a suspect pool, if you will.

At this time, judge, we're going to object to this. It's speculative and irrelevant to this case at hand. If the court believes it relevant, that its prejudicial value outweighs any probative value, and that our further objection is that none of this is from this witness's personal knowledge. Appellant objected only to Brantley's testimony regarding the random selection of victims.

On appeal, however, appellant argues that Brantley's testimony was unfairly prejudicial because profile evidence is inherently unreliable and because Brantley did not interview appellant. Appellant's trial objection does not comport with the claim he now raises. State, 11 S. Appellant's sixth point of error is overruled. The defense denied Brantley the opportunity to interview appellant.

In his seventh, eleventh, and twelfth points of error, appellant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must satisfy the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, U. Specifically, he must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance.

In his seventh point of error, appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to effectively cross-examine Brantley. Specifically, he asserts that counsel should have questioned Brantley about the reliability of profile evidence. The suggestion that cross-examination should have been conducted in another manner does not rebut the presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.

Ex parte Perkins, S. The record reflects that counsel effectively cross-examined Brantley. As such, appellant fails to meet the requirements of the first prong of the Strickland test. In his eleventh and twelfth points of error, appellant contends he is entitled to a new punishment hearing because his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the State's jury argument that the jury could not consider evidence of appellant's troubled background or the actions of law enforcement in securing appellant's arrest as mitigating evidence unless they first found that evidence somehow reduced appellant's moral blameworthiness.

Special Issue No. I'm sorry. Look at all the evidence again. Look at everything you've heard from the beginning. Looking at three things in particular; the circumstances of the offense, the defendant's character, and background, and his personal moral culpability. And it asked you to look at all of that stuff and see if you find anything, mitigating circumstances, and one thing we didn't talk about in voir dire that is in this charge is what a mitigating circumstance could be, which is evidence that one of you may find reducing the defendant's moral blameworthiness.

That's, that's what you are supposed to go through and look for. Anything in the record that reduces his moral blameworthiness. And, once again, I want you to base this answer on the evidence, and I challenge you to find anything in the record over the last two weeks that reduces his moral blameworthiness. The State did not instruct the jury that it could not consider evidence of appellant's background or his dealings with law enforcement as mitigating evidence without first finding that the evidence reduced appellant's moral blameworthiness.

Therefore, appellant has not met the requirements of either prong of the Strickland test. Appellant's seventh, eleventh, and twelfth points of error are overruled. In his eighth point of error, appellant argues the rule of Article We have repeatedly rejected identical claims. Johnson v. State, 68 S. State, 28 S. Appellant's eighth point of error is overruled.

In his ninth point of error, appellant asserts the trial court erred in denying his request to inform the jury that the failure to answer a special issue would result in a life sentence. He claims the trial court's denial violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Chamberlain, S. Appellant's ninth point of error is overruled.

Nonetheless, Article Further, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment does not require that juries be informed of the effect of any failure to reach a unanimous agreement regarding punishment. Jones v. United States, U. Appellant's tenth point of error is overruled. In his thirteenth point of error, appellant claims that under Mosley v.

New Jersey, U. In point of error fourteen, he claims that after Mosley, the mitigation special issue is infirm under the Eighth Amendment because it makes impossible any meaningful appellate review of the jury's determination. In point of error fifteen, appellant claims that Article We have addressed and rejected the claim that the mitigation special issue is infirm as a matter of federal constitutional law because it omits a burden of proof.

Jackson v. State, 33 S. We have also addressed and rejected the claim that the mitigation special issue violates the Eighth Amendment on the ground that meaningful appellate review of the jury's determination is impossible. Prystash v. State, 3 S. Appellant argues that the absence of a burden of proof is also a problem under the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Apprendi.

In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that sentence enhancements based on judicial fact findings violated due process. Appellant contends that Apprendi requires the State to bear the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigation issue should be answered in the negative. Appellant reads Apprendi too broadly. There are no statutory enhancements.

A positive jury finding on the mitigation issue does not have the potential of increasing the penalty; rather, it has the potential to reduce a defendant's sentence. Further, with respect to appellant's claim the State should bear the burden of proof as to mitigation, Apprendi does not address this burden. As to point of error fifteen, we have rejected identical claims and decline to revisit the issue.

Tong v. State, 25 S. Appellant's thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth points of error are overruled. In his sixteenth point of error, appellant contends that Texas Penal Code section 8. There is no error in omitting the definition of a word used in the statute when the word is used in its ordinary sense and is easily comprehended by everyone.

Russell v. State, 34 Tex. Likewise, when the terms used are simple in themselves and are used in their ordinary meaning, such as they are in this case, jurors are supposed to know their meaning, and therefore, a definition in the jury maturino resendiz biography is not necessary. Hogan v. State, Tex. Appellant's sixteenth point of error is overruled.

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. This opinion should be substituted for the one that was filed on May 21, The appellant raised the defense that he was insane at the time he committed this homicide. As bases for his opinion on the issue of sanity, the appellant's expert witness used the facts of this homicide and six other homicides that the appellant committed.

These facts included photographs of the scenes of the other homicides, which the appellant offered in evidence. The State objected to the photographs of the six other scenes as not being relevant, and the trial court sustained the objection. It seems to be beyond serious question that the objection of irrelevance had no merit, since the Court treats the matter as one in which relevant evidence was excluded under Rule of Evidence FN1 FN1.

Ante, at Our Rule of Evidence states that an expert witness's opinion may be based on facts or data that are not admissible in evidence if they are of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field in forming opinions or inferences on the subject. These rules are a departure from the view of the majority of common law courts that forbade an expert witness's opinion to be based on hearsay or reports that were not in evidence.

There formerly was a majority view, however, that a question is improper if it calls for the witness' opinion on the basis of reports that are not in evidence or are inadmissible in evidence under the hearsay rule without reciting their contents as hypotheses, to be supported by other evidence as to their truth. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence 3d ed.

Perhaps this is why Texas' Rule dunlike the federal rules, mandates a balancing test if the underlying facts or data are inadmissible in evidence. Goode et al. These photographs were not hearsay or extra-record evidence on which the expert relied. Rule d plays no part, in my view. The disputed fact of this homicide was the appellant's sanity at the time he committed it.

The parties agreed that this homicide was one of a series of homicides that the appellant committed. The opinion of the appellant's expert witness was that the facts of all the homicides were relevant to the appellant's sanity in this homicide. Surely they were relevant. The trial court received in evidence the facts of the other offenses, and there seems to be no disagreement about their relevance.

I believe the correct question is whether photographs of the scenes of those admittedly relevant homicides would be a distraction from the only contested issue, which was the appellant's sanity. If the Court would consider that question, perhaps it would hold, as I do, that the photographs would not have been a distraction from the contested issue.

Ante, at punctuation sic. SeeOxford American Dictionary If this, or any, evidence necessarily proved an excuse like insanity, I suppose that a court would direct an acquittal. All that is required is that evidence be relevant. Evidence which is not relevant is inadmissible. Is the limited maturino resendiz biography of this evidence different from the limited value of other evidence?

Or is all evidence that has limited value also evidence does that does not necessarily prove a fact? Is there any meaningful way to distinguish the limited probative value of these photographs from the probative value of any other item of evidence? Or does a trial court have discretion to exclude every item of evidence because every item has limited probative value?

Surely the Court cannot mean that a person who repeatedly commits crimes cannot be found to have a mental disease or defect that is also manifested in other ways. The sentence also says that photographs of the scenes of a person's six maturino resendiz biographies might show that the person was unthinkably abnormal, but might confuse the issue of whether he was insane.

Now, the trial court received oral evidence about the other homicides as relevant to the issue of insanity. Is the Court saying that that evidence also was relevant to abnormality, but not insanity? Can there be evidence of insanity that is not also evidence of abnormality? If there can be, how does the Court know that these photographs are evidence of the latter and not the former?

Or is it the photographic nature of the excluded evidence that makes it more relevant to abnormality than to insanity? Is that true of all photographs, or only of homicide-scene photographs? Or is there something about these particular photographs that would turn a juror's mind away from the issue of insanity, and into the irrelevant area of abnormality?

There is no serious question of their relevance to the issue of insanity; the Court and I do not disagree on that point. Why would the State not want the jury to have this reliable, relevant evidence to decide the issue of the appellant's insanity? I fear that the Court's opinion hints at the answer: The State did not want the jury to see these photographs because they would have been powerful evidence that the appellant was abnormal.

Proof of abnormality was a necessary step in his effort to prove that he was insane and should be confined in a mental hospital rather than given the lethal injection that the State desired. I do not intimate any view as to his sanity, or suggest that the facts would require or even justify a finding of insanity. I do think that his evidence was admissible, that he should have a trial in which the jury sees it, and that the law requires that he does.

I would sustain the appellant's first and second points and remand this case for a new trial. Murderpedia Juan Ignacio Blanco. Unfair treatment claimed Maturino Resendiz's lawyer Jack Zimmermann said Tuesday that the killer's case never received effective federal review. Insanity claim challenged Mayor Bill White's crime victims advocate Andy Kahan called Maturino Resendiz a "cold-blooded, diabolical, brutal serial killer who richly deserves his ultimate punishment.

Please write to Gov. Rick Perry on behalf of Angel Resendiz! Son of Railroad Killer's victim will be at execution By Barry Halvorson - The Victoria Advocate Tuesday, June 27, When it comes time for the state of Texas to execute convicted "Railroad Killer" Angel Maturino Resendiz today, the son of one of his victims, Josephine Konvicka, plans to be there to watch and he hopes it will finally bring closure for his family.

Railroad Killer Still Pains Ill. Over the next decade, Resendez was apprehended and tried in Texas for falsely claiming citizenship, for which he did an month prison stint ; was arrested for possessing a concealed weapon in New Orleans, receiving an month sentence, but paroled after a year ; earned a month sentence for attempting to defraud Social Security in St.

Louis ; pleaded guilty to burglary charges in New Mexico, a crime that gained him an month prison term, though again he was paroled after a year ; and was apprehended in a Santa Fe rail yard for trespassing and carrying a firearm Sentenced to Death Angel Maturino Resendez has been found guilty of capital murder and today sits on death row in Livingston, Texas.

Murders and methodology He evaded authorities for a considerable time, having no fixed addresses, and making undocumented international transit between Mexico, the United States, and Canada until he was captured. At trial, appellant made only one Rule objection to Brantley's testimony: [THE STATE]: Is there any-is the fact that the type of people that became victims of his crimes any indication about trying to avoid detection?

FN3 Appellant's trial objection does not comport with the claim he now raises. The following is the relevant portion of the State's jury argument: Special Issue No. I just ask you to forgive me and ask the Lord to forgive me for allowing the devil to deceive me. I thank God for having patience in me. I don't deserve to cause you pain.

You do not deserve this. I deserve what I am getting. Contents move to sidebar hide. Article Talk. Read Edit View history. Tools Tools. Download as PDF Printable version. In other projects. Wikidata item. Cross-border Mexican serial killer and rapist — Personal life [ edit ]. Murders and methodology [ edit ]. This section needs additional citations for verification.

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